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THE CASE AGAINST FELON VOTING
ROGER CLEGG, GEORGE T. CONWAY III, AND KENNETH K. LEE
Today, from the bluest of the blue to the reddest of the red, almost
every single state in the Union-forty-eight out of fifty-forbids felons from
voting in varying degrees.' The District of Columbia also has a felon disen-
franchisement law on its books to which the U.S. Congress acquiesced.2
Although some states have restored the franchise to felons who have fin-
ished serving their sentences, the vast majority of states continue to retain
and adopt laws that prohibit felons from voting during their terms in prison.
For example, convicts in Massachusetts could vote, even while in jail, until
2000. That November, however, the Bay State's voters faced a ballot ques-
tion on a proposed state constitutional amendment to take away the incar-
cerated felons' franchise.' The amendment passed by a landslide, with
sixty percent voting yes and only thirty-four percent voting no.4 This is
also the case with Utah. Incarcerated felons had the right to vote there until
1998, when the state's voters similarly approved a constitutional amend-
ment taking away the felons' franchise.5 The proposition passed virtually
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1. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 777, 781-82
(2002) (noting that only Vermont and Maine permit incarcerated felons to vote).
2. The current felon disenfranchisement laws in D.C., the population of which is sixty per-
cent African-American, were enacted by its own locally-elected Council after the introduction of
Home Rule in 1974, and they were submitted to, and not objected to, by the Congress of the
United States, the very body claimed here to have outlawed felon disenfranchisement. JESSE
McKINNON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2000 (2001) available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrO1 -5.pdf.
3. See MASS. CONST. ART. OF AMEND. art. III, as amended by MASS. CONST. ART. OF
AMEND. art. CXX (rendering "persons who are incarcerated in a correctional facility due to a fel-
ony conviction" ineligible to vote); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (2001) (decreeing the
same law).
4. See Massachusetts Secretary of State,
http://www.sec.state.ma.us./ele/elebalm/balmpdf/balm2000.pdf (last visited April 25, 2008) (stat-
ing the results of the aforementioned referendum under Question Number Two).
5. See UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (declaring that "any person convicted of a felony.. may
not be permitted to vote ... until the right to vote... is restored as provided by statute"); see also
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-2-101.5 (1953) (permitting restoration of franchise to felons on proba-
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by acclamation, eighty-two percent to eighteen percent. 6
Although forty-eight states have already spoken in their support for
felon disenfranchisement, others have championed felon voting rights as the
latest cause c~l~bre. The issue gained additional traction recently after sev-
eral academics noted that Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore would
have triumphed in Florida in 2000 and won the presidency if felons had
been permitted to vote in that state.7 However, allowing felons to vote is
simply problematic both as a legal and a policy matter.
As a legal matter, felon disenfranchisement laws have long been ac-
cepted in the American legal system and easily pass constitutional muster.
Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly permits states to adopt disen-
franchisement statutes, and many such laws were enacted long before Afri-
can-Americans enjoyed suffrage. These laws are also beyond the reach of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The legislative history of the VRA
and its 1982 amendments, as well as common sense, make it perfectly clear
that the statute was not intended to cover felon disenfranchisement laws.
Moreover, the VRA cannot be construed to encompass felon disenfran-
chisement laws because it would then exceed the enforcement powers of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Finally, and most fundamen-
tally, there are compelling policy rationales for such laws: society deems
felons to be less trustworthy and responsible than non-felon citizens, and
those who cannot follow the law should not participate in the passing of
laws that govern law-abiding citizens.
I. THE RACE-NEUTRAL HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
About a month before the 2004 presidential election, the Associated
Press ran a newswire article stating that felon disenfranchisement laws
"have roots in the post-Civil War [nineteenth] century and were aimed at
preventing black Americans from voting."8 Numerous other media outlets,
including the New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, also made
similar statements about the origins of felon disenfranchisement statutes.9
However, there is one problem with such statements-they simply are not
true.
Contrary to the perceived wisdom of the mainstream media, felon dis-
enfranchisement laws are deeply rooted in Western tradition as well as
American history. As Judge Henry Friendly explained, the Lockean notion
tion, discharged from incarceration, or paroled).
6. See Peter Kirsanow, The Felon Franchise, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 8, 2004),
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/kirsanow20040I080830.asp.
7. See, e.g., Uggen & Manza, supra note 1, at 789-90.
8. Millions locked out of US election, FINANCIAL REV., Sept. 23, 2004. After co-author
Roger Clegg contacted the Associated Press, it corrected the erroneous statement.
9. See Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 18, 2004),
https://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/ clegg2004 10180844.asp.
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of a social compact undergirds laws preventing felons from voting: some-
one "who breaks the laws" may "fairly have been thought to have aban-
doned the right to participate" in making laws."° Alexander Keyssar, a Har-
vard professor and a critic of felon disenfranchisement laws, has
acknowledged that such laws have "a long history in English, European,
and even Roman law."'" Similarly, a report issued by the Sentencing Pro-
ject and Human Rights Watch conceded that "[d]isenfranchisement in the
U.S. is a heritage from ancient Greek and Roman traditions carried into
Europe."12 Recently upholding Florida's statute barring felons from voting,
the en bane Eleventh Circuit observed that "[flelon disenfranchisement
laws are unlike other voting qualifications" in that they are "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history."13
In the late eighteenth century, several states began passing felon disen-
franchisement statutes. Between 1776 and 1821, eleven states disenfran-
chised persons convicted of certain "infamous" crimes. 4 By the eve of the
Civil War, more than two dozen states out of thirty-four had enacted laws
preventing those convicted of committing serious crimes from casting a
vote.'5 By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, twenty-nine
states had established felon disenfranchisement laws.'
6
This long history refutes any suggestion that felon disenfranchisement
provisions are racially motivated. 7 Their antebellum origins show that they
were aimed at whites and were maintained for race-neutral reasons: before
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states were free to, and
the vast majority did, impose direct and express racial qualifications on the
franchise.' 8 As the en banc Eleventh Circuit observed in upholding Flor-
10. Green v. Board of Elections of City of New York, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967).
11. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT To VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 62-63 (2000); see also THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
45 (2001), available at http://www.reformelections.org/data/reports/99-full-report.pdf (noting
that "[t]he practice of denying the vote to individuals convicted of certain crimes is a very old one
that existed under English law, in the colonies, and in the earliest suffrage laws of the states").
12. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT
OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998),
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/index.html.
13. Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11 th Cir. 2005) (en bane).
14. KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 63.
15. Id.
16. Accord Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974); Green, 380 F.2d at 450.
17. See KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 162 (arguing that late nineteenth century disenfranchise-
ment laws outside the South "lacked socially distinct targets and generally were passed in matter-
of-fact fashions."); Uggen & Manza, supra note 1, at 795 (explaining that some Southern states
from 1890 to 1910 did act with racial intent in passing laws that disenfranchised persons who
were convicted of crimes, but by that time, over eighty percent of the states in the U.S. already
had felon disenfranchisement laws); Alexander Keyssar, Did States Restrict the Voting Rights of
Felons on Account of Racism?, HIST. NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 4, 2004,
http://hnn.us/articles/7635.html (noting that even in some states in the post-Civil War South,
"felon disfranchisement provisions were first enacted [by]... Republican governments that sup-
ported black voting rights").
18. See KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 55-56 & Figure 3.1 (explaining that by 1855, twenty-five
of the thirty States had express "race exclusions" that prevented blacks from voting, and the five
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ida's felon disenfranchisement law, "at that time, the right to vote was not
extended to African-Americans, and, therefore, they could not have been
the targets of any [felon] disenfranchisement law."19 Over seventy percent
of the states in the Union in 1861 had felon disenfranchisement laws-at a
time when most African-Americans were still enslaved and did not have the
right to vote."0 The pre-Civil War source of these laws "indicates that felon
disenfranchisement was not an attempt to evade the requirements of the
Civil War Amendments or to perpetuate racial discrimination forbidden by
those amendments. 21
The framers of the Civil War Amendments saw nothing racially dis-
criminatory about felon disenfranchisement. To the contrary, they ex-
pressly recognized the power of the states to prohibit felons from voting.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state's denial of
voting rights "for participation in rebellion, or other crime" could not serve
as a basis for reducing their representation in Congress.2 2 As the Supreme
Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez, Section 2 is thus "an affirmative sanc-
tion" by the Constitution of "the exclusion of felons from the vote"-even
felons who, like the plaintiffs in Ramirez, had finished their sentences.23
[This conclusion] rests on the demonstrably sound proposition that
§ 1 [the Equal Protection Clause], in dealing with voting rights as it
does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form of disen-
franchisement which was expressly exempted from the less drastic
sanction of reduced representation which §2 imposed for other
forms of disenfranchisement.24
Thus, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment "expressly permits states to
disenfranchise convicted felons. 25
Nor did the Reconstruction Congresses see any conflict between felon
disenfranchisement and the Fifteenth Amendment. As the Supreme Court
observed at length in Ramirez, Congress consistently approved state consti-
tutions that excluded felons from the franchise in readmitting states to the
Union. 26 In fact, the Fortieth Congress-the very same Congress that pro-
posed the Fifteenth Amendment-approved such constitutions, and the next
Congress did so both before and after the Fifteenth Amendment was rati-
fied.27
that did not "contained only [four] percent of the free black population").
19. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1218.
20. Roger Clegg, Perps and Politics: Why Felons Can't Vote, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 18,
2004), http://www.nationalreview.com/clegg/clegg200410180844.asp (last visited July 7, 2008).
21. Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 928 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 2.
23. 418 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 55.
25. Johnson, 404 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis added).
26. Accord id. at 1218 (discussing the long history of Florida's criminal disenfranchisement);
see Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 48-52 (noting the approving congressional attitude toward state constitu-
tional disenfranchisement provisions at the time of the Reconstruction).
27. See Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 51-52 (citing readmission statutes enacted in June 1868 and
January, February, March, and May 1870). The Fifteenth Amendment was passed on February
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In light of their historical origin, felon disenfranchisement laws easily
pass constitutional muster. As any student of constitutional law knows, the
Constitution bars only laws that are facially discriminatory or are motivated
by intentional discrimination. 8 It appears that all of the felon disenfran-
chisement statutes on the books today were enacted or amended with a
race-neutral purpose.29 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently held not only that "the states had both a right to disenfranchise [fel-
ons and] ex-felons," but that they had "a compelling interest in doing so."30
As early as 1890, for example, the Supreme Court held that a territorial leg-
islature's statute that "exclude[d] from the privilege of voting... those who
have been convicted of certain offenses" was "not open to any constitu-
tional or legal objection."31  A unanimous Warren Court decision recog-
nized that a "criminal record" is one of the "factors which a State may take
into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters."32 Today's
Court agrees: holding "that a convicted felon may be denied the right to
vote" remains "unexceptionable."33
26, 1869 by the Fortieth Congress (which began on March 4, 1867 and ended on March 3, 1869),
and was ratified on February 3, 1870, during the Forty-First Congress. See The Constitution:
Timeline for ratifications of constitutional amendments,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/constitution/amendments-timeline.asp (last visited April 25, 2008).
28. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment bars only intentional discrimination by the state). This same standard almost cer-
tainly applies to its sister Reconstruction Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment. Id; see also,
e.g., City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62-65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
Fifteenth Amendment "prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgement by gov-
ernment of the freedom to vote 'on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."').
29. See KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 63 (explaining that a felon disenfranchisement law that is
facially non-discriminatory can still be unconstitutional if it was motivated by racial discrimina-
tion); cf Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1985) (striking down Jim Crow-era, mis-
demeanant disenfranchisement statute in Alabama that had been enacted with the intent to dis-
criminate against blacks).
30. Id. at 162 (discussing the rationale and widespread support for the disenfranchisement
laws).
31. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-47 (1890) (holding that territorial legislatures
had a right to impose "reasonable qualifications" on voters so long as they were "not inconsistent
with the constitution or laws of the United States").
32. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (comparing
the use of constitutionally allowable factors, such as a criminal record, with the constitutionality
of using literacy as a voting requirement).
33. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (finding that while some voting require-
ments are no longer constitutional, a convicted felon still may be denied the right to vote); see
also, e.g., Green, 380 F.2d at 451(noting that the Supreme Court "frequently recognized" the
"propriety of excluding felons from the franchise," and citing cases in support).
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II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT'S INAPPLICABILITY TO FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS
A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND ITS
AMENDMENTS
Federal circuit courts are split as to whether the Voting Rights of 1965
(as amended by the 1982 amendment) can invalidate felon disenfranchise-
ment statutes on the grounds that such laws have a racially disproportionate
impact on minorities. While the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that the
VRA can cover felon disenfranchisement laws,34 the en bane Eleventh Cir-
cuit has ruled that it does not reach such laws.35 The Second Circuit, en
bane, heard oral argument on this issue in June 2005, but has not yet issued
an opinion." The most sensible and reasonable interpretation of the VRA
is that Congress did not intend it to apply to felon disenfranchisement stat-
utes.
Congress passed the VRA to address various exclusionary practices that
had been historically employed in the South to prevent blacks from voting.
There is no reasonable indication in either the language or the legislative
history of the original VRA that it was intended to cover felon disenfran-
chisement statutes. The only provision of the Act that Congress thought
could even remotely implicate felon disenfranchisement was Section 4 of
the Act, which prohibits any requirement of "good moral character" to vote.
But the Senate Judiciary Committee's report-joined by Senators Dodd,
Hart, Long, Kennedy, Bayh, Burdick, Tydings, Dirksen, Hruska, Fong,
Scott and Javits-took pains to note that even that provision "would not re-
sult in the proscription of the frequent requirement of States and political
subdivisions that an applicant for voting or registration for voting be free of
conviction of a felony."37 On the floor, Senator Tydings repeated the point:
the law would not bar states from imposing "a requirement that an applicant
for voting or registration be free of conviction of a felony. . . . These
grounds for disqualification are objective, easily applied, and do not lend
themselves to fraudulent manipulation."3 8 The House Judiciary Committee
34. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that fel-
ons can challenge disenfranchisement statutes under the Voting Rights Act); see also Wesley v.
Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1259-61 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming that the Voting Rights Act applies to
disenfranchisement laws but finding no violation); cf Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 1333
(4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (dismissing suit for failure to state claim but assuming without dis-
cussion that the Voting Rights Act could be applied to felon disenfranchisement statute).
35. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234.
36. ** Editor's Note: The Second Circuit, en bane, held that Congress did not intend for the
VRA to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir.
2006).
37. See S. REP. No. 89-162, Pt. 3, 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562
(identifying felon disenfranchisement laws as an exception to rule which prohibits use of tests or
devices that are used to abridge the right to vote on the basis of race or color).
38. See Il1 CONG. REC. S8366 (1965) (statement of Sen. Tydings) (clarifying that the felon
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report agreed: "[The VRA] does not proscribe a requirement of a State or
any political subdivision of a State that an applicant for voting or registra-
tion for voting be free of conviction of a felony .... ,39 These are the only
references to felon disenfranchisement made in reports to the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.40 Thus, its legislative history shows that Congress did not in-
tend the VRA to cover felon disenfranchisement laws.
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to bar procedures
that "result" in the denial or abridgment of voting rights "on account of race
or color."'" The purpose of this amendment was to overrule certain Su-
preme Court decisions that Congress believed were contrary to the original
intent of the statute. The amended statutory text, however, is notably am-
biguous, and so "[u]nfortunately, it 'is exceedingly difficult to discern what
[Section 2] means. " 4 2 While the introduction of the word "result" arguably
indicates that it might cover state actions not motivated by racial animus,
the statute also incorporates the critical language in Fifteenth Amendment's
prohibition of intentional racial discrimination-"den[ial] or abridg[ment]"
of the right to vote "on account of race [or] color."43 As discussed more
fully below, the use of the words "'on account of'" means that "'[t]he exis-
tence of some form of racial discrimination ... remains the cornerstone of
[Section 2] claims,"' and shows that "Congress did not wholly abandon its
focus on purposeful discrimination when it amended the Voting Rights Act
in 1982.""
The tension between "results in" and "on account of' renders the provi-
sion ambiguous. Indeed, it is precisely because of this ambiguity that the
Supreme Court relied upon the 1982 legislative history to come up with the
so-called Gingles "factors" in order to give content to Section 2. " Ironi-
disenfranchisement laws are allowed, because they are objective means of determining qualifica-
tions for voting and are not subjective such as the good moral character requirement).
39. H.R. REP. No. 89-439, 25-26 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2457.
40. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233 (reviewing congressional statements in the House and
Senate reports for the Voting Right Act's application to states' disenfranchisement provisions).
41. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act changed the statute such that it now
reads: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color..
" 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982) (emphasis added). It has previously read: "No voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color."
42. Accord Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1229 (discussing the ambiguity in the Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act in its application to the felon disenfranchisement provisions); see Muntaqim, 366
F.3d at 116 (analyzing the scope of the Voting Rights Act to determine if it encompasses states'
disenfranchisement provisions and thereby creates a constitutional question) (quoting Goosby v.
Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, N.Y., 180 F.3d 476, 499 (2d Cir. 1999)) (Leval, J., concurring).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).
44. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 117 (reasoning that the Congress did not abandon its focus on
purposeful racial discrimination with the amendment in 1982) (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d
1494, 1515 (1 lth Cir. 1994)).
45. See Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986) (establishing the following factors
in determining validity of challenges under Section 2: (1) the extent to which minority group
members have been elected to public office; and (2) the extent to which voting in the state or po-
cally, the litigants who launched VRA challenges to felon disenfranchise-
ment laws seek to rely on this legislative history, which does not specifi-
cally deal with felon disenfranchisement, while ignoring the extensive leg-
islative history that specifically dealt with the subject.
The legislative history of the 1982 amendments does not reflect even
the slightest suggestion that Congress changed its original intent to preserve
felon disenfranchisement. Indeed, even though it "details many discrimina-
tory techniques used by certain jurisdictions," "[t]here is simply no discus-
sion of felon disenfranchisement in the legislative history surrounding the
1982 amendments."46 Given that forty-six states in 1982 had felon disen-
franchisement laws, it seems inconceivable that Congress would amend the
Voting Rights Act to invalidate the laws of forty-six states, many of which
have had such statutes since the founding of the Republic.47
Overturning felon disenfranchisement remains unfathomable to Con-
gress to this very day. The VRA's utterly "one-sided legislative history is
buttressed by subsequent Congressional acts. Since 1982, Congress has
made it easier for states to disenfranchise felons."48 The National Voter
Registration Act of 1993 not only provides that a felony conviction may be
the basis for canceling a voter's registration, but requires federal prosecu-
tors to notify state election officials of federal felony convictions.49 The
Help America Vote Act of 2002 actually instructs state election officials to
purge disenfranchised felons "on a regular basis" from their computerized
voting lists.50 The enactment of these provisions plainly "suggests that
Congress did not intend to sweep felon disenfranchisement laws within the
scope of the VRA." 51
Further, while considering what ultimately became the Help America
Vote Act, the Senate actually voted on a floor amendment that would have
required states to allow felons to vote after they had completed their terms
of incarceration, parole, or probation.5 2 The proposal would have only ap-
litical subdivision is racially polarized, also recognizing that other supportive factors may exist,
but that these are not essential to a minority voter's claim of dilution).
46. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233-35 (emphasis added) (analyzing congressional records to
find legislative intent for the Voting Rights Act's application to felon disenfranchisement provi-
sions).
47. See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 123-24 (noting prevalence of felon disenfranchisement
as a form of punishment in most states throughout U.S. history), quoted in Johnson, 405 F.3d at
1234 ("considering the prevalence of felon disenfranchisement in every region of the country
since the Founding, it seems unfathomable that Congress would silently amend the Voting Rights
Act in a way that would affect them").
48. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (emphasis in original).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-6 (2002) (requiring the U.S. attorney to give written notice of any
felony convictions in federal courts to the chief state election official).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2)(A)(ii)(l) (2002) (instructing the election officials to coordinate
state computerized voter registration list with state agency records on felony status for the pur-
pose of removing names of ineligible voters).
51. Accord Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234 (discussing the vari-
ous laws that Congress has enacted making it easier for states to disenfranchise felons).
52. See 148 CONG. REC. S797-98 (Feb. 14, 2002) (proposed amendment 2879 to S. 565).
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plied to federal elections. Its sponsors emphasized they had no quarrel with
denying franchise to convicts who were still serving their sentences. In the
words of the principal sponsor, Senator Reid, who was then the majority
whip:
We have a saying in this country: "If you do the crime, you have to
do the time." I agree with that . . .. [T]he amendment. . . is narrow
in scope. It does not extend voting rights to prisoners. I don't be-
lieve in that. It does not extend voting rights to ex-felons on parole,
even though eighteen States do that. 3
Despite being "narrow in scope," the amendment was rejected by a
large bipartisan majority: thirty-one yeas, sixty-three nays.54 Since then,
bills have been repeatedly introduced in Congress that essentially copy
Senator Reid's proposal verbatim-but not one has been voted out of com-
mittee.55 This legislative record belies the contention that Congress has
ever sought to do away with felon disenfranchisement in any form.
B. THE "RESULTS" TEST AND THE CLAIM OF DISPARATE IMPACT
There is absolutely no indication in the legislative history of the 1982
amendments of the Voting Rights Act that the introduction of the word "re-
sults" was intended to create a simple disparate impact test. In fact, the
very language of the VRA, as well as common sense, undercuts any claim
of disparate impact: the continued requirement in the statute that the denial
or abridgment of the right to vote be "on account of race or color" mimics
the key phrase used in the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition of intentional
racial discrimination.56 Indeed, the plain meaning of"on account of' is "for
the sake of' or "by the reason of"57-underscoring that "Congress did not
wholly abandon its focus on purposeful discrimination when it amended the
Voting Rights Act in 1982.""s
The inclusion of the phrase "on account of race or color" appears to
modify the word "results," to require a causational link between intentional
racial discrimination and "results." Simply put, felon disenfranchisement
laws may have a disproportional impact on certain racial minorities, but
they do not violate the VRA because the impact is not on "account of," "for
53. See 148 CONG. REC. S801-02 (statement of Sen. Reid) (speaking in favor of the amend-
ment which, aside from its narrow scope, could serve as an example to states); see also 148
CONG. REC. S804-05 (statement of co-sponsor, Sen. Specter).
54. See id. at S809 (noting that twenty-three Democrats, forty Republicans voted "nay").
55. See Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. § 701(d) (2005) (using identical
language as that in Senator Reid's proposal to establish voting rights for ex-felons who have
served their sentences); see also Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 663, 109th Cong.
(2005) (aiming to secure federal voting rights for qualified ex-offenders who have served their
sentences); Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 1433, 108th Cong. (2003); Civic Par-
ticipation and Rehabilitation Act of 2003, H.R. 259, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added).
57. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com (last visited Aug.
15, 2005) (for the definition of"on account of').
58. See Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 117(analyzing the language of the 1982 amended Voting
Rights Act to determine the legislative intent).
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the sake of," or "by the reason of race or color." As the Sixth Circuit said
in rejecting a disparate impact-type VRA claim, felons are not "disenfran-
chised because of an immutable characteristic, such as race, but rather be-
cause of their conscious decision to commit a criminal act for which they
assume the risks of detention and punishment."59 Likewise, the Eleventh
Circuit explained that Section 2 of the VRA
explicitly retains racial bias as the gravamen of a... claim. The ex-
istence of some form of racial discrimination therefore remains the
cornerstone of § 2 claims; to be actionable, a deprivation of the mi-
nority group's right to equal participation in the political process
must be on account of a classification, decision, or practice that de-
pends on race or color. The scope of the Voting Rights Act is in-
deed quite broad, but its rigorous protections, as the text of § 2 sug-
gests, extend only to defeats experienced by voters 'on account of
race or color,' not on account of some other racially neutral cause.6"
Accordingly, because "the causation of the denial of the right to vote to
felons. . . consists entirely of their conviction, not their race,"61 it "does not
'result' from the state's qualification of the right to vote on account of race
or color and thus... does not violate the Voting Rights Act. '62 Even under
Section 2, the "mere fact that many incarcerated felons happen to be black
and [L]atino is insufficient grounds to implicate the Fifteenth Amendment
and the Voting Rights Act.
63
Consequently, if statistics showing racial disparities alone are insuffi-
cient to establish a Section 2 violation even when the disparities directly re-
late to the electoral process, then statistics that are at least one step removed
from that must also, by definition, be insufficient. Yet the case against
felon disenfranchisement laws is based upon the assumption that "'race-
based disparities in sentencing"'-"that, as a result of racial discrimination
in sentencing, black and Hispanic felons are more likely to be sentenced to
59. Accord Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that dis-
enfranchisement provisions do not deny people a right to vote due to an immutable characteristic,
but because of their criminal acts), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 353 F.3d 1287, 1303 (1 1th Cir.
2003) (holding that a fact-finder could conclude under the totality of circumstances test that the
plaintiff's evidence demonstrates intentional racial discrimination behind Florida's felon disen-
franchisement provisions), vacated and reh 'g en banc granted, 377 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir. 2004),
af'd, 405 F.3d 1214 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the Voting Rights Act's prohibition
against voting qualifications that result in abridgment of the right to vote on account of race does
not apply to Florida's felon disenfranchisement provisions); see Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 (6th
Cir. 1986) (concluding that the disproportionate impact on Tennessee's black population did not
result from Tennessee's qualification of the right to vote on account of race or color); see also
Jones v. Edgar, 3 F. Supp. 2d 979, 981 (C.D. I11. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff failed to show
any connection between historical discrimination against blacks and the felon disenfranchisement
provisions).
60. Nipper, 39 F.3d 1494, 1515 (11 th Cir. 1994) (quoting League of United Latin American
Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831,850 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
61. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1239 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) (holding that the facts
presented in this case show no other causation than the criminal activity of the ex-felons for the
denial to their right to vote).
62. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 (emphasis added).
63. See Jones, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 981.
No. 1] The Case Against Felon Voting II
a term of imprisonment ... and are therefore more likely to be disenfran-
chised."'  But the case law establishes that "[e]vidence of statistical dis-
parities in an area external to voting, which then result in statistical dispari-
ties in voting," do not prove a Section 2 violation.65 Indeed, to ignore this
case law would lead to an absurdity: felons would be allowed to prove a
denial of voting rights as a result of racial discrimination in sentencing on
the basis of evidence legally insufficient to establish an actual claim of ra-
cial discrimination in sentencing. In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme
Court held that statistical disparities cannot be the basis for a Fourteenth
Amendment claim to overturn a criminal conviction or sentence; a defen-
dant must show that he himself or she herself suffered discrimination on the
basis of race, and must show that on the basis of things that happened in his
or her case.66 "Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice proc-
ess," statistical evidence "is clearly insufficient to support any inference
that any of the decision-makers in [a particular] case acted with discrimina-
tory purpose."67 This is so even in capital cases, like McCleskey.
If the VRA were construed to ban felon disenfranchisement, then con-
victed felons could invoke the very same racial statistics that they cannot
invoke to assert the right to walk the streets. To say the least, such a result
would be odd. This "logic" moves swiftly from the incongruous to the
unimaginable: the VRA would probably abolish capital punishment na-
tionwide. If similar statistical disparities appear in capital sentences, then
the carrying out of such sentences, which plainly effect a permanent denial
of the right to vote, would necessarily "result[] in a denial or abridgment of
the right... to vote on account of race or color."68
64. See, e.g., Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 118 (emphasis by the Court) (quoting felon-appellant's
brief).
65. See Farrakhan, 359 F.3d at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that statistical dis-
parities are not enough to establish vote denial under section two of the Voting Rights Act). See
also Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement
provision against a Section 2 claim that was based, as here, on statistical disparities in conviction
rates); Ortiz v. City of Philadelphia Office of City Com'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 F.3d 306,
314-15 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that no evidence was presented to show that the neutral vote purg-
ing law discriminates against a particular class); Salas v. Southwest Texas Jr. College Dist., 964
F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiff failed to link low voter turnout by the
Hispanic population to past official discrimination); Irby v. Va. State Bd .of Elections, 889 F.2d
1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989) (deciding that the disparities between whites and blacks in repre-
sentative positions does not in itself show that discrimination played a role in the selection or elec-
tion process).
66. See 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (ruling that the evidence failed to show that any decision
maker in defendant's case acted with a discriminatory purpose, and that the statistical racially-
correlated discrepancy did not show a significant risk of racial bias in Georgia's capital sentencing
process).
67. Id. at 297.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982).
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C. ANY PRIMA FACIE SHOWING OF ADVERSE "RESULTS" Is EASILY
REBUTTED
Assuming arguendo that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act established some form of a pure disparate impact standard, states could
easily rebut any prima facie case of disproportional impact because of their
strong and legitimate interests in maintaining their own electoral laws.69 As
discussed in Section IV, states have substantial reasons to limit the right to
vote to persons deemed trustworthy and thereby exclude children, aliens,
the mentally incompetent, and those who have been convicted of serious
crimes.
The Supreme Court has held that "the State's interest in maintaining an
electoral system . . . is a legitimate factor to be considered by courts among
the 'totality of circumstances' in determining whether a Section 2 violation
[of the 1965 Act] has occurred."" Thus, for example, the en banc Fifth
Circuit rejected a challenge to Texas's county-wide election system for its
district court judges-notwithstanding alleged disproportionate impact on
minority candidates-on the grounds that the state had a "substantial inter-
est" in linking jurisdiction and electoral base, and thereby promoting "the
fact and appearance of judicial fairness."71
There is little doubt that the states have an equally substantial interest in
preventing felons, especially those still incarcerated, from voting and poten-
tially affecting elections. The Sixth Circuit held that the state's "legitimate
and compelling interest" in disenfranchising felons outweighed any sup-
posed racial impact.7" Indeed, the Framers of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments found state authority to disenfranchise felons to be of such impor-
tance that they expressly permitted it in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment."73 As the Supreme Court put it, "[n]o function is more essen-
tial to the separate and independent existence of the States and their gov-
ernments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution
the qualifications of their own voters for state, county and municipal of-
fices."74
D. THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE: A CAUTION AGAINST PREEMPTION OF
STATES' POWERS
An expansive and unreasonable reading of the Voting Rights Act to
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes not only contradicts the intent of
69. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 173 (2001) (dis-
cussing the lack of constitutional or VRA violations in felon disenfranchisement provisions).
70. Houston Lawyers'Ass'n v. Att'y Gen. of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 426 (1991).
71. Clements, 999 F.2d at 868-69 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
72. See Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260-61 (holding that when the felon disenfranchisement law is
viewed in context of "totality of circumstances," it is apparent that the law does not violate the
VRA).
73. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1232 (analyzing the constitutional implications of applying the
Voting Rights Act to state felon disenfranchisement provisions).
74. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (emphasis added) (discussing the con-
stitutional objective of preserving states' rights and governing autonomy).
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Congress, but it also upsets the delicate balance between federal and state
powers. The "clear statement" rule-which applies when, as in the case of
the VRA, the statutory text is ambiguous-cautions courts to tread lightly in
interpreting vague statutes to avoid impinging upon the traditional spheres
of the states:
[I]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance be-
tween the States and the Federal Government, it must make its in-
tention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute ....
[Congress must] make its intention clear and manifest if it intends
to pre-empt the historic powers of the States.75
This rule of construction controls whenever a federal statute touches on
"traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal bal-
ance."76 When it applies, the rule requires that, absent a clear statement,
courts must "interpret a statute to preserve rather than destroy the States'
'substantial sovereign powers. '
In Gregory v. Ashcrofi, the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited Missouri
from enforcing a mandatory retirement age for state judges.78 The Court
held that it did not. The Court applied the clear statement rule because the
case implicated "the authority of the people of the States to determine the
qualifications of their government officials."7 9 The fact that Congress's in-
tent on the issue was "at least ambiguous" sufficiently resolved the ques-
tion.8" Under the clear statement rule, the Court could not "give the state-
displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity."8
Felon disenfranchisement involves authority that is at least as important
as the State's power to determine "the qualifications of their government
officials," as it involves the power to determine who gets to choose those
officials and their qualifications. If defining the qualifications of important
government officials lies at the heart of representative government, then
surely defining who decides what those qualifications will be is equally, if
not more, important. That by itself suffices to require a clear statement, but
even more is involved here: the fundamental state power to "defin[e] and
enforc[e] the criminal law," for which, of course, "the States possess pri-
mary authority."82
75. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (emphasis added; citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 461 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Pa. Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at
460-61).
78. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452.
79. See id. at 463.
80. Id. at 467.
81. Id. at 464, 467 (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
82. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the longstanding tradition of defer-
ence to state legislature's role in criminal justice matters).
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The confluence of these two fundamental lines of state authority ex-
pressly appears in the Constitution's text. Thus, not only does the Constitu-
tion defer to the States to set voter qualifications even for federal elec-
tions,83 but, as noted above, the Constitution affirmatively sanctions the
States' historic authority to disenfranchise people "for participation in re-
bellion, or other crime. 's4 The Constitution provides that the States have
the primary, if not exclusive, authority to decide whether felons should
vote.
Accordingly, if Congress wishes to disturb the federal-state balance in
the area of voter qualifications, they must be clear about it. Congress cer-
tainly knows how to be quite clear when it comes to voting rights: Congress
was clear about literacy tests;85 educational-attainment requirements;
86
knowledge tests;87 moral character tests; 88 vouching requirements; 89 Eng-
lish-language requirements; 90 English-only elections;9' and poll taxes; 92 to
give just a few examples.
The text of the VRA makes no clear statement about felon disenfran-
chisement. Therefore, it cannot be construed "to pre-empt the historic pow-
ers of the States" 93 and "to destroy the States' 'substantial sovereign pow-
ers' ' 94 by prohibiting felon disenfranchisement.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS
There is yet another reason why Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
cannot be read to bar felon disenfranchisement laws: such an interpretation
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, cl.l (requiring that those who elect United States Repre-
sentatives "shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the
State Legislatures").
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (2005) (prohibiting states from conducting literacy tests as
a qualification for voting unless it is administered to all voters, is wholly in writing, and answers
are provided to voters within twenty-five days upon request); id. at § 1971(a)(3)(B) (defining lit-
eracy test as "any test of the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter"); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c)(1) (2005) (explaining that "[tlhe phrase 'test or device' shall mean any re-
quirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the
ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter...").
86. Id. at § 1973b(c)(2) (explaining that literacy tests include tests to "demonstrate any edu-
cational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject").
87. Id.
88. Id. at § 1973b(c)(3).
89. Id. at § 1973b(c)(4).
90. See id. at § 1973b(e)(1) (prohibiting the States from conditioning the right to vote upon
the ability to understand the English language).
91. See id. at § 1973(b)(f)(I) (forbidding the States from holding English-only elections be-
cause of widespread discrimination of citizens who do not speak English).
92. Id. at § 1973(h)(a) (finding that poll taxes have no relation to the electoral process, pre-
vent poor citizens from voting, and have been used as a means to deter minorities from voting).
93. Gregory, 501 U.S. 452 at 461.
94. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 209 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61).
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would exceed Congress' enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments.
These two Reconstruction amendments contain parallel grants of power
to Congress to "enforce"95 the amendments' substantive provisions "by ap-
propriate legislation."96 But as the Supreme Court has emphasized in recent
years, Congress cannot rewrite the constitutional provisions, as "Congress
does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is." 97 It
has no power to engage in a "substantive redefinition of the . . . right at is-
sue," 98 and can only "enact ...prophylactic legislation"-legislation that
"proscribes facially constitutional conduct"-to the extent necessary "in or-
der to prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct." 99
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has insisted that "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or reme-
died and the means adopted to that end."'00 To meet that test, Congress
must do two things: (a) "identify conduct transgressing ... substantive pro-
visions" of the amendments; and (b) "tailor its legislative scheme to reme-
dying or preventing such conduct."' l
The first requirement demands that Congress develop a "legislative re-
cord" that demonstrates a "history and pattern" of unconstitutional state
conduct.'0 2 In other words, "[f]or Congress to enact proper enforcement
legislation, there must be a record of constitutional violations."'' 3 To meet
the second requirement, the purportedly prophylactic legislation must not
be "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu-
tional behavior."'" Congress thus must narrowly "tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."'0 5
There can be no dispute: Section 2 would fail both prongs if it was con-
strued to prohibit felon disenfranchisement. To begin with, "when Con-
gress enacted the VRA and its subsequent amendments, there was a com-
plete absence of congressional findings that felon disenfranchisement laws
were used to discriminate against minority voters."'0 6 That is enough to
doom any construction of Section 2 that reaches felon disenfranchisement.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, the Supreme Court struck down the
1970 amendments to the VRA that, among other things, tried to lower from
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
97. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
98. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
99. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) (emphasis added).
100. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520.
101. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil, Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639
(1999).
102. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
103. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231.
104. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
105. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 628.
106. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231 (emphasis added).
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twenty-one to eighteen the minimum voting age throughout the Nation. 7
The Court struck down the voting-age provision to the extent it applied to
state elections. In announcing the Court's judgment, Justice Black noted
that "Congress made no legislative findings that the 21-year-old vote re-
quirement was used by the States to disenfranchise voters on account of
race."' 8 Congress has not made any such legislative findings about felon
disenfranchisement either.'0 9
Not only has Congress not found that felon disenfranchisement has
produced "any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,""o and
not only does "the legislative record... simply fail[] to show that Congress
did in fact identify [such] a pattern,""' the record actually shows that Con-
gress found the opposite. Congress saw nothing wrong with the "frequent
requirement of States and political subdivisions that an applicant for voting
or registration for voting be free of conviction of a felony,""' 2 because it
found that this requirement was "objective, easily applied, and do[es] not
lend [itself] to fraudulent manipulation.""' 3 It found that "tests for literacy
or good moral character should be scrutinized, but felon disenfranchisement
provisions should not.""' 4 In short, "not only has Congress failed ever to
make a legislative finding that felon disenfranchisement is a pretext . . . for
racial discrimination[,] it has effectively determined that it is not." ' 5
Applying Section 2 to strike down all felon disenfranchisement laws
would be "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, uncon-
stitutional behavior.""' 6 Instead, it would "attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections""-something the Constitution simply does not
allow.
107. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
108. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
109. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 (striking down application of Americans with Disabilities
Act against State employers because "[t]he legislative record.., simply fails to show that Con-
gress did in fact identify a pattern" of unconstitutional discrimination by States against the dis-
abled); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) (striking down civil remedy for gender-
motivated violence because "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States");
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (2000) (striking down application of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act against State employers because of "Congress' failure to uncover any significant pattern
of unconstitutional discrimination here").
110. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
Ill. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
112. S. REP. No. 89-162, pt. 3, at 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508, 2562.
113. 111 CONG. REc. S8366 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Tydings).
114. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233.
115. Baker, 85 F.3d at 929.
116. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
117. Id. at 509.
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IV. THE POLICY REASONS FOR FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT
During a 2000 presidential debate in Iowa, the front-runner candidate
explicitly endorsed the ban on felon voting: "The principle that convicted
felons do not have a right to vote is an old one, it is well-established," he
said, adding that "felonies-certainly heinous crimes-should result in a dis-
enfranchisement."" 1
8
That candidate was Vice President Al Gore. As set forth below, Gore
had good policy reasons for supporting the ban on felon voting. Yet this
issue has grown heavily politicized in recent years, in large part due to the
contested results in Florida in 2000. However, if it is soberly analyzed out-
side the prism of partisan politics, there are strong justifications for felon
disenfranchisement.
First, felon disenfranchisement laws are justified on the basis of
Locke's notion of the social contract: As Judge Henry Friendly once put it,
someone "who breaks the laws" may "fairly have been thought to have
abandoned the right to participate" in making them." 9 Furthermore:
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that per-
petrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the legislators who
make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors who must
try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider their
cases. 120
That same reasoning motivated Massachusetts then-governor Paul Cel-
luci in 2000 to support a ballot initiative stripping incarcerated felons of the
right to vote after prisoners began to organize a political action commit-
tee. 2 ' A Massachusetts state legislative leader commented about the
State's now-abolished practice of allowing incarcerated felons to vote: "It
makes no sense. We incarcerate people and we take away their right to run
their own lives and leave them with the ability to influence how we run our
lives?"'12
2
Second, disenfranchisement has traditionally been deemed a part of
punishment for committing a crime. 23 Criminal punishment can be meted
out in various ways, including imprisonment, fines, probation and the with-
drawal of certain rights and privileges. In the American system, it has long
118. Iowa Brown & Black Presidential Forum (Jan. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-action/primdeb/primdeb0 11 7tr.html (last visited April 25, 2008).
119. Green, 380 F.2d at 451.
120. Id.
121. Clegg, supra note 68, at 172-73.
122. Id. at 172 (emphasis added) (quoting Editorial, Jailhouse Vote, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
1999, at A26 (quoting Massachusetts State Rep. Francis Marini)).
123. See, e.g., Todd F. Gaziano, Election Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Mar. 14,
2001, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/Test03 1401 .cfm (last
visited April 25, 2008) (noting that felon disenfranchisement is permitted under section two of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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been established that "the States possess primary authority for defining and
enforcing the criminal law."' 24
Even more fundamentally, society considers convicts, even those who
have completed their prison terms, to be less trustworthy and responsible
than non-convicted citizens.'25 In other areas of the law, full rights and
privileges are not always restored to convicts, even though they may have
"paid [their] debt to society."' 26 For example, federal law prohibits the pos-
session of a firearm for anyone indicted for or convicted of a felony punish-
able by at least one year in prison.'27 Also under federal law, anyone who
has a "charge pending" or has been convicted of a crime punishable by im-
prisonment for one year or more cannot serve on a jury.'28 So if someone
who has a "charge pending" against him is deemed incapable of sitting in
judgment of the fate of a single litigant, it hardly seems unreasonable to say
that someone convicted of a felony cannot help shape the fate of a city, a
state, or the entire nation. Even outside the realm of civic rights and privi-
leges, society recognizes that an ex-convict may be less reliable than others.
For example, employers routinely ask prospective employees whether they
have been arrested (let alone convicted of a felony) because they suspect
that the mere fact of an arrest may be an indication of untrustworthiness.
Critics of felon disenfranchisement laws note that these laws have a
disproportionate impact on certain racial minority groups.'29 While society
can be sensitive to such concerns, it is not a sufficient reason to abolish
long-standing and justifiable laws in the attempt to achieve some form of
racial balance. As W.E.B. DuBois once wrote, "Draw lines of crime, of in-
competency, of vice, as tightly and uncompromisingly as you will, for these
things must be proscribed; but a color-line not only does not accomplish
this purpose, but thwarts it."'3 In fact, the abolition of felon disenfran-
chisement laws may have the unintended effect of creating "anti-law en-
forcement" voting blocs and victimizing the vast majority of law-abiding
citizens who live in high-crime urban areas-people who are themselves dis-
proportionately black and Latino.' The political left's compassion-
ignoring the effect of its agenda on law-abiding people of color-is mis-
placed. Ultimately, the real solution is to deter and prevent the crimes from
being committed, not to create loopholes and exceptions for punishments.
Yet there may be some room for reasonable compromise on the issue of
felon franchise. Not all crimes are equal, and some crimes are more repre-
124. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Clegg, supra note 68, at 174.
126. Id.
127. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1) (2004).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000).
129. See, e.g., The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/IssueAreaHome.aspx?IssuelD=4 (last visited April 25, 2008);
Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Alabama,
http://www.brennancenter.org/contentlpages/voting-rights-restorationefforts-in-alabama (last
visited April 25, 2008).
130. Clegg, supra note 68, at 176.
131. Id. at 177.
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hensible and more likely to suggest untrustworthiness. 3 2 One can make a
convincing case that someone who has committed a relatively minor crime
and who has exhibited good behavior for an extended period of time upon
the completion of his prison or parole term can request that his right to vote
be restored.'33 Indeed, the National Commission on Federal Election Re-
form-a bipartisan, blue-ribbon panel chaired by former Presidents Ford and
Carter-has made a similar recommendation.'34 The restoration of an ex-
convict's voting right should be done on a case-by-case basis through an
administrative mechanism, because it would be difficult to draft a statute
drawing a bright-line rule that takes into account factors such as the seri-
ousness of the crime, the potential for recidivism, and the number of prior
offenses.
V. CONCLUSION
The people of forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have made
their voices clear in support of laws that disenfranchise felons. Neither the
Constitution nor the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides plausible grounds
to invalidate the felon disenfranchisement laws that are on the books today.
It would be a crime to distort the Constitution or the intent of Congress to
overturn the will of the people of forty-eight states via judicial fiat.
132. Id. at 174-75.
133. Id.
134. See NAT'L COMM'N ON FED. ELEC. REFORM, supra note 11, at 45 (emphasis added)
(recommending disenfranchisement until felons have fully served their sentences, including any
term of probation or parole, or alternatively a lifetime disenfranchisement that nonetheless permits
a clemency-like mechanism for restoring the franchise, in "particular cases"); see also NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS at
4.6.1 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf (last visited
April 25, 2008) (recommending that "States should allow for restoration of voting rights to other-
wise eligible citizens who have been convicted of a felony (other than for a capital crime or one
which requires enrollment with an offender registry for sex crimes) once they have fully served
their sentence, including any term of probation or parole").
